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Democracy, governance and legitimacy in Zimbabwe since the November 
2017 military coup 
This article focuses on the democracy and legitimacy debates in Zimbabwe after the 
ouster of Robert Mugabe from power by his erstwhile ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in 
November 2017. President Mnangagwa popularized the terms “Second Republic” and 
“New Dispensation” to show that his regime differed from Mugabe’s in terms of govern-
ance style. The position of this article is that Mnangagwa’s regime could not abandon 
the system established under the reign of Mugabe. Instead, it argues that the Second 
Republic reflects continuities of the Mugabe era being transposed into a quasi-military 
edifice whose commandist approaches denigrate cries for democracy and transparency. 
This qualitative research draws on data from interviews with political elites in the oppo-
sition and ruling parties as well as secondary sources. 
Keywords:	 democracy,	governance,	resettlement,	legitimacy,	elections,	
multiparty
Democracia, governação e legitimidade no Zimbábue desde o golpe militar 
de novembro de 2017
Este artigo centra-se nos debates sobre democracia e legitimidade no Zimbábue após a 
destituição de Robert Mugabe do poder pelo seu antigo aliado, Emmerson Mnangagwa, 
em novembro de 2017. O Presidente Mnangagwa popularizou os termos “Segunda 
República” e “Nova Dispensação” para mostrar que o seu regime era diferente do de 
Mugabe em termos de estilo de governação. A posição deste artigo é que o regime de 
Mnangagwa não podia abandonar o sistema estabelecido sob o reinado de Mugabe. Em 
vez disso, argumenta que a Segunda República reflete a continuidade da era Mugabe 
transposta para um edifício quase militar cujas abordagens “comandantes” denigrem os 
apelos à democracia e à transparência. Esta pesquisa qualitativa baseia-se em dados de 
entrevistas com elites políticas dos partidos na oposição e no poder, assim como em fontes 
secundárias.
Palavras-chave: democracia, governação, restabelecimento, legitimidade, 
eleições, multipartidário
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The most dominant debate after the ouster of Robert Mugabe in November 
2017 has been on the forms and content of “democracy” in Zimbabwe under 
the new government led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe con-
stitutionally undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy (Sylvester, 
1995, p. 405) whose core components include multipartyism, free, fair and open 
periodic elections to enable the populace to choose their leaders freely (Taylor & 
Williams, 2002, pp. 560-561). In any true democracy, the people, through their 
own	chosen	representatives,	have	the	final	say	in	matters	of	governance	and	in	all	
issues to do with their livelihoods (Milimo, 1993, p. 37). This article evaluates the 
Second Republic in terms of (1) its (in)ability to move away from Mugabe’s au-
thoritarianism and (2) its inclination to perpetuate Mugabe’s legacy, entrench its 
rule and defy the clarion call for democracy from the main opposition Movement 
for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) under Nelson Chamisa.
Conceptual/theoretical framework 
This article uses Rotberg’s (2004, p. 1) theory of governance. The theory holds 
that	governance	is	the	delivery	of	political	goods	to	citizens	and	the	better	the	
quality of that delivery and the greater the quantity of political goods being de-
livered, the higher the level of governance, everywhere at jurisdictional level, 
not	 just	 in	Africa	 (Rotberg,	 2004,	p.	 1).	Bratton	and	van	de	Walle	 (1997,	p.	 97)	
analyse democracy at two levels: in behavioural terms and at the structural lev-
el. In behavioural terms it relates to meaningful competition, participation and 
liberties. At structural level it means the electoral system, multiparty organs and 
an independent legislature and organs. However, they conclude that, in Africa, 
institutional	pluralism	is	the	recipe	for	intensified	particularisms	and	therefore	
antithetical	to	any	robust	transition	to	democracy	(Bratton	&	van	de	Walle, 1997, 
p. 97). Worse still, democracy is generally conceived in neo-colonial terms be-
cause it is prescriptive and based on Western standards. There is, quite unfortu-
nately, too much premium of multiparty elections in Africa without making an 
appraisal of the past colonial state. Competing opposition parties seem not to 
have substantial alternatives in terms of policy, resulting in voters voting with-
out choosing (Akinrinade, 2000). Museveni of Uganda introduced a “no party 
democracy” where all political elements were incorporated into the structures 
of the National Resistance Movement (Akinrinade, 2000). In this case, as almost 
elsewhere in Southern Africa, national consensus was prioritized in a bid to es-
tablish enduring democratic structures.
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Statement of the problem 
Zimbabwe,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 suffers	 from	 electoral	 illegitimacy	 and	
lawlessness. The Second Republic under Emmerson Mnangagwa appears to 
be increasingly focusing its energies towards consolidating power through 
any	means	necessary	as	opposed	 to	constructing	effective	 representative	 insti-
tutions that make economic development and improved standards of living in 
the	 country	possible.	Zimbabweans	 continue	 to	 suffer	 the	 effects	of	 an	econo-
my that was subjected to 37 years of plunder by the governing elite under the 
former President Robert Mugabe’s tutelage. The coup leaders who arrogated to 
themselves the mandate to rule after the elections of July 2018 are earnestly per-
petuating the Mugabe legacy and perfecting it to suit the corporate interests of 
the military-backed government with a substantial proportion of careerist who 
retired to assume the work of government. Military intervention is inherently 
undemocratic, yet Western countries, among them Britain as the former colonial 
power, were quick to legitimize a regime which was a direct product of a mili-
tary takeover. The regime, through a popular election whose outcome remains 
disputed,	was	sanctified	by	the	Constitutional	Court	that	confirmed	the	position	
of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) that the incumbent Emmerson 
Mnangagwa had won the presidential race amidst numerous election irregulari-
ties and lack of transparency.
Literature review 
The	 political	 system	 operative	 in	 Zimbabwe	 is	 quite	 difficult	 to	 character-
ize as either a democracy or an illiberal society in which elections are regularly 
held in accordance with the country’s Constitution despite not being free and 
fair. Zimbabwe was led by the former president Robert Mugabe for 37 years, 
being compelled to involuntarily surrender power to his erstwhile comrade of 
the armed struggle, Emmerson Mnangagwa, thanks to a coup in November 2017 
by the military. Institutions of democracy that serve as constitutional safeguards 
on the exercise of executive powers include the Auditor General, the Public 
Protector, Public Service Commission and the Human Rights Commission among 
many others. A strong civil society underpins democracy (Hugo et al., 1995, p. 
115). It includes a strong and vigilant press, the labour movement, professionals, 
students	 and	 civil	 organisations	 and	 these	ought	not	 to	be	 affiliated	with	 any	
political party. Mugabe was constrained from declaring Zimbabwe a one-party 
state by the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution that entrenched multipartyism 
(Stoneman	&	Cliffe,	1989,	p.	91).	
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In Zimbabwe, the military is an institution that people perceive as key to the 
sustenance of ZANU-PF hegemony since independence from Britain in 1980. In 
rare circumstances such as Ghana under Jerry Rawlings, democracy can be estab-
lished through a coup as argued by Varol (2017, p. 106). The military is also viewed 
as	an	instrument	of	the	suppression	of	democratic	change	and	Zimbabwe	is	a	fit-
ting example. Western scholars are blinded by romantic mythology that contends 
democratic transitions are led by the people taking to the streets (Varol, 2017) as 
happened in Zimbabwe in November 2017. However, many Western countries 
as well as the United States of America (USA) referred to these November events 
as	befitting	a	military	coup.	Hardly	a	week	after	President	Mnangagwa’s	election	
victory as president, the USA renewed its Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (ZIDERA). This Act was passed in 2001 by the American Congress 
to compel Zimbabwean authorities to return to the rule of law and to respect 
human rights following the government’s racialized land redistribution pro-
gramme (African Arguments Forum, 8 November 2018). In most dictatorships, 
the military is often the only institution with the clout to challenge the ruler. They 
are apt to act in support of their corporate interests as measured in resources 
and	influence	and	in	good	times,	the	military	is	a	reliable	pillar	of	the	status	quo	
(Varol, 2017, p. 108). 
Western style democracy presupposes a consensus on the values that set lim-
its to partisanship. The political process in many states is about domination, not 
alternation	in	office,	which	takes	place	by	coups	rather	than	constitutional	proce-
dures (Kissinger, 1994, p. 811). The sad truth is that holding elections has been ex-
posed as reversible and tentative, and internationally sanctioned elections have 
installed into power the very elements they were intended to defeat (Varol, 2017, 
p. 114). The Nyalali Commission established by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania to de-
bate the possibility of introducing multipartyism noted that true democracy rest-
ed on four essential pillars namely respect for the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, periodic free and fair elections for leadership and policies and freedom 
of information through free mass media (Tambila, 1995, p. 477). The decision to 
consider the multiparty option in Tanzania came after Nyerere’s realization that 
the one-party system his government had pursued since independence in 1963 
had not transformed Tanzania into a socialist egalitarian state. This background 
knowledge about Tanzanian socialism provides an appreciation of how democ-
racy can be exercised even within the one-party political strategy, and when, 
through Nyerere’s initiative, politicians were encouraged to break away from 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi to form their own parties (Ngasongwa, 1992).
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Lodge (2004) argues that consolidation of power in stable democracies de-
pends on institutionalized party systems in which rules and regularities in how 
parties compete are wisely observed. He further intimates that this is also de-
pendent	on	the	existence	of	organisations	with	firm	social	followings,	ideological	
predictability, good connections with interest groups and possessing their own 
corporate identity that is independent of the personalities at the helm (Lodge, 
2004). It is suggested from his analysis of parties that strong parties should there-
fore	be	able	to	attract	durable	support	so	that	they	can	survive	their	charismatic	
founders. One of the most interesting observations Lodge makes is that parties 
that	remain	in	office	for	a	long	time	subject	themselves	to	factionalism	as	infor-
mal groupings are constituted within the party around certain leaders. These fac-
tional grouping result from an institutionalised system of patronage that controls 
appointments not only in the party, but also in government. Such an approach 
blurs state-party boundaries and in most cases, executive national decisions by 
governments originate from the party hierarchy, in which case the party is su-
preme all the way. Consequently, many African governments end up dominat-
ed by political careerists, a development predicated on the fact that parties are 
perceived as instruments to one’s political advancement. Mohan, Pumpuni and 
Abdulai (2018, p. 274) in their analysis of party politics in Ghana, focus on the 
role	that	political	ideas	play	in	shaping	resource	governance	with	specific	refer-
ence to oil. 
Political parties are characterized as civil society organisations that summa-
rise the interests of a particular group, articulate and represent them (Mexhuani 
& Rrahmani, 2017, p. 1). They also intimate that parties are established from the 
social	elite	that	gather	around	them	a	group	of	influential	supporters	to	defend	
their positions and from citizens who seek people’s support of the same opin-
ion in order to achieve political and social change (Mexhuani & Rrahmani, p. 1). 
There is one interesting dynamic in ZANU-PF as a political party. It is both a rev-
olutionary and a political party. The former is premised on the party’s guerrilla 
war	history	against	imperialism	and	the	latter	relates	to	its	reorganization	and	
transformation in readiness for power to rule through constitutional means. This 
dynamic is also important because it facilitates our understanding of the party’s 
behaviour and suspicions over the intentions of the whites whom they fought 
against	for	fifteen	years.
Democracy	 is	 difficult	 to	 establish	 in	 ethnically	 diverse	 societies.	 Resource	
distribution poses serious challenges particularly where some regions are replete 
with resources whilst others are poor. The case example of the distributive con-
cerns in Ghana can be universally applicable to Africa, given the fact that tenden-
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cies towards secession in most parts of the continent, for example, Zimbabwe, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, among others, are situated at 
the heart of resources that are not judiciously and even-handedly distributed. 
Modern democracy is erroneously only conceptualized in terms of political par-
ties which, in Africa, are assumed to play an important role in making represent-
ative democracy work, at least in the African sense. 
The Mandela Administration intervened twice, in Zambia and Malawi, to dis-
suade	presidents	from	seeking	a	third	term	in	office	in	the	face	of	mobilized	public	
opposition (Friedman, 2008, p. 34). It was during Thabo Mbeki’s rule that South 
Africa	offered	sustained	aid	and	comfort	to	the	Mugabe	regime	in	Zimbabwe	by	
sending a delegation which endorsed elections regarded by independent sourc-
es as fraudulent (Friedman, 2008, p. 34). At that time Zimbabwe had become a 
pariah state, having been at odds with Western countries and the rest of Europe 
for the regime’s human rights violations and the absence of the rule of law. The 
South African delegation was silent on human rights violations. This is why Prah 
(2003) argues that many African political parties are cliques and aggregations of 
personalities (p. 3). According to Prah, multiparty political systems are the most 
reliable systems for the cultivation, development and institutionalization of de-
mocracy	because	it	allows	a	hundred	flowers	to	blossom	and	a	hundred	schools	
of thought to contend. Prah also points out that the only elections known to have 
been free and fair without any vote rigging within multiparty systems were those 
ushered	in	by	the	first	post-independence	governments	(Prah,	2003).	This	view	
suggests that the pressure exerted on African governments to toe the democracy 
path has contributed to the phenomenon whereby elections become an exercise 




This research is based on a qualitative paradigm. It was motivated by the need 
to	interrogate	the	efficacy	of	a	military	takeover	of	the	state	at	a	time	Zimbabweans	
were yearning for a return to good governance and democratic rule after many 
years of de facto one-party rule. The ideas discussed in this article are drawn from 
focus group discussions with individuals interested in the democracy debate in 
Zimbabwe. Secondly, two focus group discussions were held with members of 
the Zimbabwe History Association (ZHA) to complement the six interviews in 
Harare the researcher held with political activists from ZANU-PF and the MDC 
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Alliance. Some of the questions from these interviews were raised during my 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) research on “Constraints on multiparty democracy in 
Zimbabwe”. Of importance was the Skype interview with Senator David Coltart 
of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Secondary sources 
such as textbooks, journals, newspapers and ZANU-PF and MDC party manifes-
tos were used to complement current arguments raised on the democracy debate. 
The current political climate in Zimbabwe is not conducive to conducting in-
terviews with politicians within ZANU-PF rankings. The democracy debate in the 
country is an area of serious contestation because the presidential election out-
come of the 2018 elections is endlessly disputable, thus rendering any research 
on the issue of democracy dangerous. However, the results of this study remain 
useful despite the above highlighted shortcomings, in making an informed eval-
uation of Zimbabwe’s democracy over years.
Discussion and analysis 
The politics of accumulation 
The seizure of white owned farms by the Zimbabwean government that start-
ed	in	earnest	in	2000	was	a	culmination	of	a	stand-off	between	Zimbabwe	and	
Britain. Britain had back trekked on its earlier commitment to compensate white 
farmers whose land would have been availed to government for redistribution 
on a willing-seller willing-buyer principle. The constitutional provision in the 
Lancaster House Agreement constrained the Zimbabwe government from inter-
fering with property right in line with modern democratic tenets that over-em-
phasize	this	proviso.	Because	some	whites	had	come	to	settle	permanently	in	the	
country, they resisted the government overtures, and this led to the unleashing of 
violence on those whites whose farms the government had designated to peasant 
resettlement.	This	era	was	popularized	as	the	Third	Chimurenga	or	jambanja, a 
word that denotes high levels of lawlessness as armed war veterans undertook 
pioneering operations into white owned farms. As the ZANU-PF stalwart Nathan 
Shamuyarira noted, the area of violence is an area ZANU-PF has strong, long and 
successful history (Financial Gazette, 5-10 October 2000). Mugabe was at pains to 
assert that ZANU-PF has degrees in violence, and he threatened to go back to the 
trenches should he lose the 2002 presidential elections (Chaumba et al., 2003) that 
pitted	him	against	Morgan	Tsvangirai	of	the	MDC.	This	confirmed	the	sentiments	
of the ZANU-PF stalwart and journalist, Nathan Shamuyarira, that the area of vi-
olence was an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long and successful history 
(Financial Gazette, 5-10 October 2000). As a result of all these pronouncements, 
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ZANU-PF is viewed as a party that thrives on having enemies and when it there 
are none, it creates them to remain in existence (Ankomah, 2018).
During the jambanja era, the landscape was visibly politicized, and it was char-
acterized by a proliferation of signposts that proclaimed “no go area: war vets 
inside”.	Zimbabwean	flags	were	planted	on	anthills	and	hung	from	trees	with	
posters labelled “Land is the economy and the economy is the land. Zimbabwe 
will never be a colony again” (Chaumba et al., 2003, p. 543). Tekere argued that 
too	many	farms	were	already	owned	by	too	few	chiefs	(top	government	officials)	
(Sachikonye, 1989, p. 122). Tekere appealed to Joshua Nkomo, the vice president 
then, to make appeals to Cabinet and to party leadership at their meetings to be-
gin reversing the trend set in motion in 1980 before he could go to white commer-
cial farmers and dispossess them of their farms (Financial Gazette, 21 July 1989). 
The new crop of black bourgeoisie that replaced white capital now has vested 
interests in the existing status quo in land ownership and it has become the major 
beneficiary	of	the	foiled	land	redistribution	programme.	This	new	black	elite	has	
become the landowning class and has no intention of giving up that ownership 
nor	of	supporting	a	significant	redistribution	amongst	the	peasants	(Sachikonye,	
1989, p. 123). Yet democracy is not limited to elections alone but encapsulates 
everything people should share and enjoy together on equal terms. This means 
that the land issue upon which the armed struggle for decolonization and inde-
pendence was premised, regarded fair land redistribution as an ingrained aspect 
of democracy.
Powers-that-be that managed to acquire several farms from the MDC side 
settled	on	that	land	in	terms	of	the	2008	Global	Political	Agreement	(GPA). The 
Agreement categorically stated that there was no reversal of the land reform 
(GPA, 2008) and the MDC	absentee	land	beneficiaries	too,	were	unwilling	to	re-
turn the fertile land to the former white landowners (Shubin, 2013, p. 58). The 
list of absentee landlords in Zimbabwe was similar to the list of British noblemen 
and therefore, the British government was paying compensation to themselves or 
to their kith and kin (Shubin, 2013, p. 44). Although the GPA	affirmed	the	irrevers-
ibility of land acquisition and redistribution, the parties to this GPA	differed	on	
the methodology of acquisition and redistribution. They were agreed that coloni-
al	racial	land	ownership	patterns	established	during	the	colonial	era	and	largely	
maintained in the post-independence period were unsustainable and against the 
national interest, equity and justice (Shubin, 2013, p. 52).
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The politics of plots and the “new dispensation” 
The 2017 coup leaders sounded South Africa, the African Union (AU) and the 
European Union (EU) before they seized power from Mugabe. Many people after 
the 2017 November coup felt that the swearing in of the coup President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, even before elections were held, heralded a return to democracy, 
yet he too, had a tainted past. For example, Mnangagwa ran Mugabe’s military 
and spy apparatus for much of his political career, including the Matabeleland 
massacre. He also commanded the military in the 1998 DRC war in which his gen-
erals	handsomely	benefited	from	clandestine	and	pirate	mining	operations	that	
saw the plundering of copper and diamond in large quantities (Venage, 2017, p. 
15). Most military generals used the proceeds from these mining deals in build-
ing hotel-sized mansions in the country. Mnangagwa was popular for his ruth-
lessness	in	the	Gukurahundi	fiasco	and	in	ZANU-PF’s habitual election violence 
that made him the most feared politician in Zimbabwe (Meredith, 2018, p. 136).
In	2017,	the	military	intervened	ostensibly	to	arbitrate	and	fix	the	instability	
within the ruling ZANU-PF party and this fact was glossed over by the interna-
tional media. It also missed the fact that the real struggle that gave credence to a 
coup in November 2017 was predicated on the unhappiness of the military that 
the counter-revolutionary faction within ZANU-PF, the G40 around Mugabe, had 
hijacked state and party power (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18). In response to the alleged 
counter-revolutionary force, the military postulated: 
What is obtaining within the revolutionary party is a direct result of the machina-
tions	of	counterrevolutionaries	who	have	infiltrated	the	party	and	whose	agenda	
is to destroy it from within […] We must remind those who are behind the current 
shenanigans	that	when	it	comes	to	matters	of	protecting	our	revolution,	the	mili-
tary will not hesitate to step in. (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18) 
Each successful coup increases the odds of a further coup. This suggests that 
each military government carries with it the seeds of its own removal (Londregan 
& Poole, 1990). The view among many African scholars interested in the study of 
democracy is that Britain is the paragon of liberal democracy that places heavy 
emphasis on people’s freedoms, individual rights and the supremacy of the 
Constitution. In the case of Zimbabwe, the decolonization process was a failure 
as	evidenced	by	fifteen	years	of	fighting	between	the	recalcitrant	regime	of	Ian	
Smith and the nationalist parties such as ZAPU and ZANU. One of the unresolved 
matters	at	the	Lancaster	House	Agreement	that	ended	the	war	in	Rhodesia	was	
the issue of land. The British during the negotiation process sought to preserve 
the rights of whites to property including land, and inserted a clause in the liberal 
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Constitution that would allow the black government to re-gain land for redistri-
bution on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis and that the British government 
would fund the process of land acquisition by the Zimbabwe government based 
on that principle. 
The	British	reneged	on	the	promise	to	fund	the	process	of	land	resettlement	
and Tony Blair, the British prime minister, clearly intimated that the British gov-
ernment that he then led was not obligated to honour the arrangement. The de-
velopment compelled Mugabe to push through parliament an Act to compulso-
rily acquire land from white landowners without compensation. In a hurry to 
stop the land reform as envisaged under the Compulsory Land Acquisition Act, 
Britain is alleged to have released $12 million to the Nigerians who deployed 
themselves in various provincial capitals for ease communication throughout 
the country (Godobori, 2011). The British were therefore complicit in the 2002 
failed	 coup	 attempt	 (Godobori, 2011). Coups are responsible for about 75 per 
cent of democratic failures, making them the single largest danger to democracy 
(Spivak,	2017).	Another	alleged	coup	attempt	in	2007	involved	Life	Mleya	(aide-
de-camp to Mugabe), and one of his accomplices, Fakazi Mleya – who headed the 
signal corps responsible for the army’s national communications –, was given a 
lethal injection and then sent to Heroes Acre (The Zimbabwean, 16 August 2007) in 
Harare for burial as a national hero. Ncube, Rugeje and Moyo were under house 
arrest by June 2017 (from 2007 when they were alleged have organized a coup) 
(The Zimbabwean, 16 August 2007). The Western countries were consulted about it 
and indicated that they publicly condemned it, but secretly supported it only if it 
would restore democracy in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe’s military, in all intents and purposes, is an integral part of ZANU-
PF architecture although it is not seen on the party’s organogram. The two enti-
ties developed from the same nucleus during the armed struggle. The military 
that executed the so-called bloodless coup in November 2017 denied that it was a 
coup, but rather, a military arbitration in a party in which the military are stake-
holders (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18). Sibusiso Moyo, one of the generals who made 
a televised speech to the nation on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
(ZBCTV) announced: “The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) remain the major 
stakeholder in respect of the gains of the liberation struggle and when these are 
threatened, we are obliged to take corrective measures” (Ankomah, 2018). 
Due	 to	 factional	 fights	 within	 the	 ruling	 ZANU-PF party between the old 
guards as remnants or survivors of the armed struggle and the Young Turks pop-
ularly known as Generation 40, there was an internal party clash between the old 
and the new. The possibility of a coup was played down although Grace Mugabe 
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of the G40	faction	raised	it	first	when	she	stated	that	Mnangagwa	and	his	team	
were	plotting	to	seize	power	and	that	action	had	to	be	swiftly	taken	to	prevent	
that from happening. The military point of view was that the history of the rev-
olution	could	not	be	re-written	by	those	who	did	not	participate	in	it	and	that	
the	military	remained	committed	to	protecting	the	revolutionary	legacy	against	
those who were bent on hijacking (Ankomah, 2018, p. 19). This was after Oppah 
Muchinguri,	a	woman	freedom	fighter,	had	amidst	factional	skirmishes	within	
the party, been replaced by Grace Mugabe as chairperson of the party’s Women’s 
League. Patrick Chinamasa, of the Lacoste faction, lamented that Grace could not 
come	to	the	party	and	then	fire	a	person	like	Oppah	with	all	her	liberation	cre-
dentials. Chinamasa had been given an obscure Ministry of Cyber Security af-
ter	his	demotion	from	the	Minister	of	Finance	in	a	Cabinet	reshuffle	in	October	
2017 (DailyNews, 10 October 2017). On the other hand, Muchinguri intimated that 
all was well in the party before Mugabe invited his wife into politics and that 
Mugabe’s downfall was Grace’s responsibility for she destroyed the personality 
of the president singlehandedly (Ankomah, 2018, p. 19).
The military argued that the November events were not a coup, but a re-ar-
rangement of power within ZANU-PF. They also argued that had they not inter-
vened, there would have been an outbreak of violence following the sacking of 
Vice President Mnangagwa (New African, 2017, p. 59). The sacking of Mnangagwa 
had cleared the path for Grace to be able to contest the vice president position 
during the Congress set for December 2017 and the only process that could avert 
this development was a military intervention or a party rebellion. This was to 
be done swiftly before Mnangagwa lost relevance in the power struggle in the 
party. After the sacking of Mnangagwa, there were threats that Mnangagwa’s 
allies would also be purged at the above Extraordinary Congress in December. 
The Congress was extraordinary in order to deal precisely and decidedly with 
the Mnangagwa faction. 
Vice	President	Mpoko	issued	a	statement	in	October	2017	attacking	Mnanga-
gwa	of	peddling	lies	for	political	purposes.	Mnangagwa	was	accused	of	attempt-
ing to undermine the authority of President Mugabe and destabilize the coun-
try by peddling lies to fan ethnic tensions for political purposes (The Zimbabwe 
Independent,	6	October	2017).	In	response	Mnangagwa	confirmed:	“I	have	an	im-
peccable	history	of	unflinching	loyalty	to	the	party	and	His	Excellency,	Mugabe,	
and have never acted in a manner that undermines his authority or the stability 
of Zimbabwe” (Ankomah, 2018). The paradox of it all is that Mnangagwa, in less 
than two weeks after these allegations and his outright denial, assumed the lead-
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ership of the state in a dramatic turn of events in favour of the Crocodile (Lacoste) 
faction that he led.
Role of the military in regime sustenance 
There is reliance on the legitimacy of the gun in ZANU-PF politics. The mili-
tary leaders derive their power from the barrel of the gun. The reason for this is 
that the transformation of liberation movements into modern political parties is 
frequently complex and incomplete (RAU, 2018). As Way commented: 
revolutionary struggles frequently create strong ties between the political leaders 
and the security forces. Having emerged out of the revolutionary struggle, the lea-
dership	of	the	Zimbabwean	security	forces	is	often	deeply	committed	to	the	survi-
val of the regime and bathed with the philosophy of the ruling party. (Way, 2011, 
p. 20)
Way (2011) opines that a violent revolutionary struggle (such as the one fought 
in Zimbabwe) tends to produce a generation of leaders with the stomach for vi-
olent	repression.	Mandaza	(1991)	and	Bratton	and	van	de	Walle	(1997)	discuss	
the	propensity	for	military-party	conflation	and	the	resort	to	violence.	From	the	
above, it can be argued that liberation parties disposed more towards violence 
than towards peaceful resolution mechanisms because they aver that they are 
still at war with forces of counter-revolution and sabotage. As a result, they do 
not transform themselves into modern political parties because they, according 
to	Moyo	(1992),	have	still	not	taken	off	their	uniforms	and	laid	down	their	guns.	
To them, life is characterized by continuous strife.
The civil-military theory postulates that in modern democratic states, the 
military has to subordinate itself to civilian choices of leadership (Maringira 
&	Masiya,	2017,	p.	400).	Morris	Janowitz	refers	the	military	as	a	“constabulary	
force” in the sense that it is mandated to provide protection to civilians from any 
threat, not to protect the regime in power (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 400). Yet 
in most cases, the military’s sole client is the state, and this makes the military 
political. For example, army generals in the Middle East have always maintained 
that politics is too important to be left to civilians (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 
402). Major General Chedondo in Zimbabwe postulated: 
As soldiers we will never be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because it is the 
only party. A National Defence Force the world over is there to protect national 
politics, national integrity, the Executive and other systems that form part of the 
Government. By virtue of this, defence forces automatically become a political ani-
mal. (The Zimbabwe Daily, 9 May 2012) 
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This reasoning is not unique to the Zimbabwe military alone but could be the 
position in most African states. Due to the of lack of legitimacy resulting from 
elections that are not transparently coordinated at various levels of the electoral 
process, the security institutions in Zimbabwe have always played a very sig-
nificant	role	in	keeping	losers	at	the	helm	of	power	by	deciding	on	who	should	
rule	 in	exchange	for	 inflated	military	budgets	designed	to	satisfy	 them	almost	
immediately before they have time to cause trouble. The military, through the 
Joint Operations Command (JOC) was integral to Mugabe’s electoral comeback 
in the June 2008 presidential re-run. It is alleged that it managed the elections by 
controlling the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which then announced 
the election results (Barclays, 2010, p. 93). 
Vice President Joice Mujuru lost the vice presidency to Mnangagwa in 2014 
because the army supported him. In one of the popular ZANU-PF youth jingles 
Zvikaramba toita zvenharo (If it fails we use force) it is purported that the military 
belongs to ZANU-PF and that if, at any given time, ZANU-PF loses the presidential 
seat to the opposition, they would rather use the army to retain power than sur-
render it to the opposition (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 406). The military that 
took over in 2017 promised to serve as a guardian of democratic progress and 
as a representative of the people. The prospect for free and fair elections became 
far-fetched. The military played a prominent role in Zimbabwean politics since 
independence in 1980 from Britain. They kept Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power in 
2008 when the MDC	Tsvangirai	backed	out	of	the	presidential	run-off	(Sguazzin	
& Latham, 2019). 
Any negotiations must reckon with the military factor because the army plays 
a key role in the country’s politics. The army serves as a guarantor of ZANU-PF’s 
power. In return, the military is venerated by the ideology of the ruling party 
and its comrades given lucrative landownership and positions within the state 
parastatals. The military personnel are deployed to strategic positions in the var-
ious state institutions responsible for governance such as Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the National Oil Company of 
Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). In the 2002 presidential elections, the army chief Vitalis 
Zvinavashe declared that his forces would only recognize a government headed 
by a veteran of the armed struggle (Masunungure, 2008). 
Events in November 2017 were described as “military assisted transition”, 
“not a coup coup” or “a coup that wasn’t a coup”. It was endorsed by the street 
mobs in Harare, the High Court, Southern Africa Development Conference 
(SADC) and the African Union (AU). The army took extreme measures which 
included a speech of return to normalcy as if they represented institutional in-
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terests and as a show of democracy in order for Zimbabwe to qualify for in-
ternational support and aid (News Stateman, 2017). JOC developed strategies to 
influence	 election	outcomes	 in	 2000,	 2002,	 2005,	 2008,	 2013	 and	2018.	Mugabe	
wanted to concede defeat in 2008 but the securocrats, the JOC	and	beneficiaries	of	
Mugabe’s	patronage	system	refused	to	allow	this	to	happen	(Thomas-Greenfield	
& Wharton, 2019, p. 9). It was a de facto coup. This makes the military deeply 
entrenched in the economy making their economic interests just as powerful as 
their fears for accountability for human rights. This was evidenced by the report 
by Valerio Sibanda to the Kgalema Montlanthe Commission that President set up 
to investigate the 1 August shooting in Harare when six civilians were killed. In 
his testimony, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander denied military 
responsibility (News24,	13	November	2018)	despite	audios	showing	the	army	fir-
ing live ammunition into panicking crowds of demonstrators1.
The Mugabe legacy: change and continuity and the fate of democracy 
Commenting on a multiparty system in Zimbabwe after the inception of the 
MDC in 1999, Mugabe in an address to the ZANU-PF Politburo remarked:
The party in opposition vows never to be in agreement with the party in govern-
ment because to be seen to be in agreement with the party in government on fun-
damental issues is to show oneness with that party and therefore creates no basis 
for the existence of a separate party […] the opposition party is there to oppose the 
government whether the government is right or wrong […] that is a waste of the 
taxpayer’s money. (Hugo et al., 1995) 
The army moved away from Mugabe because of his inclination towards a per-
sonalist regime that would cut the generals from power. He sacked Mnangagwa 
in a bid to position his wife Grace to succeed him and usher in dynastic poli-
tics (News Statesman, 2017). Mugabe’s impeachment was based on Mugabe’s al-
lowing	his	wife	to	usurp	constitutional	power	(Thomas-Greenfield	&	Wharton,	
2019). Mnangagwa was sworn in as president on 24 November 2017 even if elec-
tions had not been conducted. In his inauguration speech, Mnangagwa praised 
Mugabe as a father, a mentor, a comrade-in-arms and my leader (Meredith, 2018, 
p. 138). He proceeded to build a government that was wholly exclusive of the 
opposition MDC that had assisted ZANU-PF to impeach Mugabe and force him 
to tender his resignation under duress. An alternative arrangement, for the sake 
of national unity and political stability in the country, could have been the estab-
1  The video was viewed on the WhatsApp social media by everyone with a smart phone. One soldier was in a 
kneeling	position	resting	his	gun	on	his	shoulder	and	firing	before	another	one	came	to	stop	him	from	doing	so.
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lishment of a transitional arrangement involving the major political players from 
the political divide together with other civic organisations pending elections in 
2018. 
Mugabe	exhibited	his	attachment	to	brute	force	in	1976	when	he	set	out	his	
views about electoral democracy if he won the elections: He postulated: “Our 
votes must go together with the guns […] the gun which produces the vote 
should remain its security guarantor. The people’s vote and the people’s guns are 
always inseparable twins” (Meredith, 2018, p. 129). Those who opposed Mugabe 
such as Josiah Magama Tongogara and Solomon Mujuru, whose Chimurenga 
(war of liberation) name was Rex Nhongo, found themselves demoted or victims 
of suspicious accidents. Mugabe based his regime on a system of patronage in 
which he controlled all appointments to senior posts in the civil service, defence, 
police, and parastatals. His new elite was allowed to engage in a scramble for re-
sources, property, farms and business contracts. For example, Phillip Chiyangwa 
boasted that he was rich because he belonged to ZANU-PF and he encouraged 
those who wanted to get rich to join ZANU-PF (Meredith, 2018, p. 134). Under 
these arrangements, Mugabe warned that the MDC would never be able to form 
a government in his lifetime even after he died. This was after the 2000 referen-
dum in which 55% voted against the proposed Constitution (Slaughter & Nolan, 
2000) that was set to give enormous powers to the president. The 2008 re-run saw 
Mugabe make a vow to go to war to prevent an MDC victory: “We are not going 
to give up our country because of a mere X.	How	can	a	ballpoint	pen	fight	with	
a gun?” (American Enterprise Institute, 19 June 2008). That mantra is still very 
relevant in ZANU-PF.
Capture of state institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms vis-à-vis 
democracy 
The	2017	coup	in	Zimbabwe	was	sanctified	when	the	High	Court	ruled	that	
the military actions were constitutionally permissible and lawful. The High Court 
was therefore captured to legitimize a coup. To Magaisa, the coup amounted to 
effectively	legalizing	military	intervention	in	the	affairs	of	government	(Thomas-
Greenfield	&	Wharton,	 2019).	Deputy	Finance	Minister	Terence	Mukupe	 said:	
“How can we say the soldiers took the country from Mugabe to come and hand it 
over to the opposition leader Nelson Chamisa? MDC will never rule Zimbabwe” 
(Thomas-Greenfield	&	Wharton,	2019).	Mnangagwa’s	regime	is	known	for	gross-
ly disproportionate use of police and the military to stop protesters and looting. 
Mugabe had an insatiable lust for power. In 2008 he stated: “If you lose an elec-
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tion and are rejected by the people, it’s time to leave politics” (Winter, 2017). He 
did not do it after losing to Tsvangirai. 
Dispute resolution mechanisms in Zimbabwe have not been tested or have 
a history of partisanship. In 2011, SADC accepted an election replete with vio-
lations of its own guidelines in the DRC. Mugabe threatened to leave SADC “if 
it made silly decisions” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2). This was on the 
eve of the July 2013 harmonised elections. These elections went ahead despite 
SADC facilitated negotiations failure for six years to implement security sector re-
forms (realignment), media reforms and accessibility to all, cancelation of POSA. 
ZANU-PF	continued	to	have	influence	over	important	elements	of	the	judiciary.	
To Mugabe, the 2013 electioneering was a do-or-die contest for ZANU-PF in de-
fence of its revolution (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 6).
Single party state was adopted in Zambia in 1973. The argument was that it 
was the best antidote for divisive tribalism (Milimo, 1993, p. 35). Separation of 
executive,	judiciary	and	legislative	powers	into	clearly	identifiable	and	separate	
units of government in both legal terminology and in practice takes place in lib-
eral democracies. Whereas in single party states, the party, rather than the people 
through	their	elected	representatives,	has	the	final	say	in	matters	of	governance.	
Irregularities that cast doubts on the freeness and fairness of elections include re-
stricted opposition campaigning facilities, bias in media coverage, misappropri-
ation of public transport to aid the ruling party, intimidation and arrest of oppo-
nents by the police force, violence against the opposition, abuse of secret ballot, 
misappropriation of campaign funds, high voter absenteeism (Baynham, 1992).
Rigging in Zimbabwe is practiced not only in controlling the work of election 
officials	and	law	enforcement	agents,	but	also	in	manipulating	a	defective	elec-
toral roll system with millions of ghost voters. Elections are a critical aspect of 
democracy as they enable the citizens to exercise their democratic right to choose 
who shall rule them. Elections in Zimbabwe have become a mere concession to 
prepare to democratise, a gross form of lip service to democracy characterized by 
the ZANU-PF’s regime’s use of authoritarian tactics such as violence and intimi-
dation to coerce the electorate to vote for it (SW Radio Africa, 3 June 2011).
Conclusion and recommendations 
Zimbabwe became politically polarized after the 2017 coup and soon after the 
subsequent 2018 harmonized election whose presidential results were, and still 
remain, contentious. After many years of de-industrialisation under Mugabe’s 
presidency, his ouster brought hopes of a return to democratic rule and economic 
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development. However, a military government cannot be trusted to govern dem-
ocratically. The intimates that prospects for political reconstruction depend on 
the willingness of the political establishment to acknowledge the indispensability 
of opposition formations and to genuinely open up political space for credible 
elections. It concludes that there is need for a paradigm shift in the government’s 
modus operandi from the culture of violence and impunity to the politics of tol-
erance, reconciliation and accountable governance as sine qua non for economic 
progress and political stability to exist. Democracy in Africa is still threatened by 
the	military,	ethnic	conflicts	and	secessionism.	
If levels of economic development are high, Africa can be able to create sus-
tainable	 democratic	 systems.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 governments	 to	
implement democracy when people struggle with poverty and when there are 
extreme inequalities that make societal cohesion inconceivable. The quality of 
African	leadership	matters	a	great	deal	and	Africa	has	had	a	fair	share	of	tyranni-
cal, corrupt and incompetent politicians who have dealt the continental democ-
racy project a death blow. In any case, many African governments are primarily 
pre-occupied with the challenge of establishing order and stability and second-
arily with the problem of establishing democracy in a bid to manage ethnicity. 
Governance, legitimacy and democracy issues remain central to Zimbabwean 
politics and unless the electoral laws are revised to allow for equal participa-
tion by competing political parties, ZEC is freed from political interference by 
ZANU-PF and the Judiciary is politically independent. The revolutionary men-
tality within ZANU-PF is a stumbling block in the national drive towards democ-
racy	because	the	military	repeatedly	affirms	its	decision	not	to	have	as	president	
someone with no liberation credentials. The 2023 elections are likely to produce 
yet disputed presidential outcome because no substantial bureaucratic changes 
in media control, ZEC, Electoral Laws and security institutions have been made, 
except	for	those	that	were	intended	to	buttress	the	incumbent	regime	and	to	con-
solidate its hold on power ahead of the next elections.
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